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Josephs (1975) describes two distinct phenomena in Palauan that may be classified as differ-
ential object marking (DOM—Comrie 1979; Bossong 1985; Aissen 2003; de Swart 2007). I
call them imperfective differential object marking (I-DOM) and perfective differential object
agreement (P-DOA). In I-DOM, the direct object of an imperfective verb may either co-occur
with the overt accusative case marker er or bear no morphological case, an alternation condi-
tioned by the animacy and definiteness hierarchies argued to govern DOM patterns in many
other languages. By contrast, the direct object of a perfective verb is never case-marked, but
the DP triggers object agreement on the verb that matches its ϕ-features. Still, not every direct
object triggers agreement—this “differential object agreement” constitutes P-DOA. Josephs
(1975), Georgopoulos (1991), and Woolford (2000) hypothesize that the class of DPs that are
not case-marked under I-DOM is identical to the class of DPs that do not trigger object agree-
ment morphology under P-DOA. Despite the significant overlap between these two classes, I
offer empirical evidence that they are not entirely identical: singular, non-human, non-specific
DPs are not case-marked in I-DOM, but they do trigger object agreement in P-DOA. The
evidence arises from two different areas of Palauan syntax: the licensing of NPIs and the ex-
istential construction’s definiteness effect. If the proposed analysis is correct, then the Palauan
data reveals that the pertinent features governing DOM alternations (e.g. specificity, human-
ness, etc.) may differ not only across languages, but even across constructions within a single
language.
1. Differential Object Marking Systems
Differential object marking (DOM) phenomena have been noted in languages from a variety of dif-
ferent families around the world (for examples, see Comrie 1979; Bossong 1985; Aissen 2003; de
Swart 2007; and many others). DOM phenomena are characterized by non-unform morphological
case-marking of direct object DPs, and whether or not a given DP is marked depends on the DP’s
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features. It has been observed (Aissen 2003: 436) that the higher in prominence a direct object is,
the more likely it is to be overtly case-marked. Prominence can be measured along the animacy
and definiteness scales—see (1) and (2) below—and possibly others.
(1) ANIMACY SCALE: Human > Animate > Inanimate
(2) DEFINITENESS SCALE: Pronoun > Proper name > Definite DP > Specific indefinite DP >
Non-specific indefinite DP
Prominence is measured in opposite directions depending on whether subjects or objects are be-
ing considered. Aissen formulates a robust cross-linguistic analysis of DOM in which different
languages may draw cutoffs at different points along the prominence scales, resulting in different
types of differential object marking systems. Aissen’s analysis predicts that if morphological case
marking is obligatory (or optional) for a direct object DP with feature values that place it at some
position on the animacy and definiteness scales, then it is also obligatory (or optional) for any other
DP with features that place it at any higher position on the scales.
Morphologically, DOM comes in two flavors. In dependent-marking languages (such as
Hindi, Indo-European; see Mohanan 1994), a case marker appears on the DP direct object. In head-
marking languages (such as Kiyaka, Bantu; see Kidima 1987), object agreement morphology ap-
pears on the verb. Cross-linguistically, languages are typically either head-marking or dependent-
marking (Nichols 1986) and thus ordinarily employ either the case marker strategy or the object
agreement strategy in the differential marking of direct objects, but not both strategies. However,
Palauan provides an example of a language that not only has both dependent-marking and head-
marking properties but also utilizes both morphological differential object marking strategies.
2. Differential Object Marking in Palauan
Palauan is a Western Austronesian VO(X)S langauge with approximately 15,000 speakers in the
Republic of Palau. Palauan features a typically Austronesian syntax: there are predicates of any
lexical category and no copula, all major syntactic categories are head-initial, and there is wide-
spread subject (left-)topicalization (see Josephs 1975; Waters 1980; Hagège 1986; Georgopou-
los 1991; Lemaréchal 1991 for details). Palauan’s dependent-marking and head-marking DOM
systems are conditioned by the aspect of the verb.1 To distinguish the two systems, I call them
imperfective differential object marking (I-DOM) and perfective differential object agreement (P-
DOA). Below in (3) and (4), examples of direct object DPs with various degrees of animacy and
definiteness are provided with the marking conditioned by I-DOM and P-DOA, respectively.2
1 Henceforth, the terms imperfective and perfective aspect will be used pre-theoretically to identify the morphological
variants of the verbs, following the Palauan literature. This usage should not be taken to imply that the Palauan aspec-
tual system necessarily exhibits the properties of more familiar aspectual systems in other languages. An investigation
of the interesting semantic and pragmatic properties of the Palauan aspectual system must be left aside.
2 The verbs in (3) and (4) are all formed from the root
√
kal ≈ ‘food.’ The morphemes meN- and oN- are allomorphs
of the imperfective verbalizer prefix, while -m- and -o- are allomorphs of the perfective verbalizer infix (Nuger 2007;
see also Wilson 1972 and Flora 1974). The bek- prefix is a causative/applicative morpheme (Nuger forthcoming; see
also Josephs 1975, 1997, 1999).
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(3) I-DOM: inanimate direct objects bear ACC case marker, er, if singular AND specific. All
human direct objects are case-marked.3
a. Ng
3SG
menga (>
√
kal + meN-)
eat.IMPFV
er
ACC
a meradel
orange
a sechelik.
my.friend
“My friend is eating an orange (i.e., a particular orange)/the orange.”
b. Ng
3SG
menga (>
√
kal + meN-)
eat.IMPFV
a meradel
orange
a sechelik.
my.friend
“My friend is eating oranges/some oranges/the oranges.”
or: “My friend is eating orange/some orange (or other).”
c. Ng
3SG
omeka (>
√
kal + bek- + oN-)
feed.IMPFV
er
ACC
a ngalek
child
a sechelik.
my.friend
“My friend is feeding a child/some child/the child.”
d. Ng
3SG
omeka (>
√
kal + bek- + oN-)
feed.IMPFV
er
ACC
a rengalek
children
a sechelik.
my.friend
“My friend is feeding children/some children/the children.”
(4) P-DOA: inanimate direct objects trigger agreement on the verb if singular AND specific. All
human direct objects trigger agreement.
a. Ng
3SG
mo
go
kol-ii (>
√
kal + -o- + -ii)
eat.PFV-3SG
a meradel
orange
a sechelik.
my.friend
“My friend is going to eat an orange/the orange.”
b. Ng
3SG
mo
go
kma (>
√
kal + -m-)
eat.PFV
a meradel
orange
a sechelik.
my.friend
“My friend is going to eat oranges/some oranges/the oranges.”
c. Ng
3SG
mo
go
mekel-ii/(*meka) (>
√
kal + bek- + -m- (+ -ii))
feed.PFV-3SG/feed.PFV
a ngalek
baby
a sechelik.
my.friend
“My friend will feed a child/some child/the child.”
d. Ng
3SG
mo
go
mekel-terir/(*meka) (>
√
kal + bek- + -m- (+ -terir))
feed.PFV-3PL/feed.PFV
a rengalek
children
a sechelik.
my.friend
“My friend will feed children/some children/the children.”
As suggested by the English translations of the sentences above, the descriptive general-
ization to draw from the data is that inanimate direct objects get morphological accusative case
marking via either a marker on the DP (if the verb is imperfective) or an object agreement suffix on
the verb (if the verb is perfective). What is clear is that both markers reflect (or induce) a singular
interpretation of the inanimate DP. What is much less clear is whether the markers also reflect (or
induce) a specific interpretation.
3 That the accusative case marker er is homophonous with the language’s only preposition er is probably not note-
worthy. Palauan’s very limited set of function words serve multiple purposes. Still, accusative er does not seem to be
prepositional: the disappearance of er before plural/non-specific inanimate DPs as in (3b) is particular to DPs in object
position. DPs that cannot be marked with accusative er can nevertheless be introduced by er without any problem in
true prepositional environments like PP-adverbials, goal/source arguments, etc.
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Previous research (e.g., Josephs 1975: 260; Georgopoulos 1991: 24–25; Woolford 2000: 218;
inter alia) has taken the class of DPs that must be marked by the accusative case marker er in I-
DOM to be identical to the class of DPs that trigger object agreement in P-DOA. If this is indeed
the case, then I-DOM and P-DOA can be construed as a single syntactic phenomenon with two
different morphological instantiations. For instance, the licensing of syntactic Accusative Case
could be formalized in terms of an Agree relation between transitive v and the direct object DP
(following Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2004) with the morphology determined post-syntactically by the
aspectual features in the verbal complex, resulting in a case-marker on one hand and object agree-
ment morphology on the other (following McFadden 2004). Of course, this analysis relies on the
assumption that a DP with particular feature values can either trigger both I-DOM and P-DOA
(depending on the aspect of the verb that selects the DP) or neither of them. There should be no
class of DP that triggers one but not the other.
New data suggests that this assumption is untenable. (3) and (4) contain only count noun
DPs in direct object position. Once mass noun DPs are taken into account, the parity begins to
break down—compare (5) and (6).
SCENARIO: Lani and Bino have gone on a walk together. Bino’s stomach
suddenly starts to hurt, and he feels dizzy. Lani is trying to figure out why.
(5) I-DOM: non-specific direct object optionally marked with ACC marker er (with an associated
difference in meaning).
a. Ke
2SG
millim
drank.IMPFV
er
ACC
a ralm
water
[er
at
a blil
house
a delak
my.mother
el
LNK
mechas]
old.woman
pro?
you
Ng
3SG
mekngit
bad
pro.
it
“Were you drinking the water at my grandmother’s house? It’s bad.”
b. Ke
2SG
millim
drank.IMPFV
a ralm
water
[er
at
a blil
house
a delak
my.mother
el
LNK
mechas]
old.woman
pro?
you
Ng
3SG
mekngit
bad
pro.
it
“Were you drinking water at my grandmother’s house? It’s bad.”
(6) P-DOA: non-specific direct object must trigger agreement.
a. Ke
2SG
ngilelm-ii
drank.PFV-3SG
a ralm
water
[er
at
se
that.time
er
of
a do-muchel
1PL.INCL-start
el
LNK
merael
walk
pro]
we
pro?
you
“Did you drink (the) water when we started walking?”
b. * Ke
2SG
ngilim
drank.PFV
a ralm
water
[er
at
se
that.time
er
of
a do-muchel
1PL.INCL-start
el
LNK
merael
walk
pro]
we
pro?
you
(“Did you drink (the) water when we started walking?”)
What do (5) and (6) tell us? The mass noun direct object a ralm ‘water’ shows the same difference
in meaning with the I-DOM pattern in (5a–b) as its count noun correlate in (3a–b), unsurprisingly.
In both instances, the absence of er reflects a plural and/or non-specific interpretation of the DP
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direct object. Yet while the lack of object agreement with the count noun DP a meradel ‘orange(s)’
in (4b) is perfectly acceptable, the lack of agreement with the mass noun DP a ralm ‘water’ in (6b)
is ungrammatical.
This disparity between (4b) and (6b) strongly suggests that the presence or absence of ob-
ject agreement morphology in P-DOA does not depend on the specificity of the direct object DP,
whereas the presence or absence of the case-marker er in I-DOM is almost surely sensitive to
specificity—note the difference in meaning between (5a) and (5b). If this is true, then only I-DOM
shares the cross-linguistic properties of two-dimensional DOM systems that are determined by def-
initeness and animacy (though number also seems to be relevant in Palauan; this will be discussed
below in more detail). P-DOA, by contrast, is just a standard object agreement paradigm with a
paradigm gap for 3PL non-human objects. Given this difference between the two constructions,
a unified DOM analysis of I-DOM and P-DOA is much less attractive. An analysis that treats
I-DOM and P-DOA as different phenomena seems preferable.
If only P-DOA is truly insensitive to specificity, then a clear prediction arises: the disparity
observed in the case-marking of mass nouns should extend to the domain of count nouns. Non-
specific non-human singular count noun DPs, like a meradel ‘orange’ in (3b) and (4b), should
pattern with mass noun DPs and trigger singular object agreement in P-DOA if specificity is irrel-
evant. In the next section, an examination of the distribution of the Palauan negative polarity item
ngii di and the syntax of existentials will help us see that this is exactly what happens.
3. Teasing Apart the Facts: Polarity and Existentials
A complication arises from the fact that there are no morphological differences between defi-
nite and indefinite DPs in Palauan—the nouns themselves are not marked for definiteness, and
both definite and indefinite DPs are marked with the determiner a. Due to this complication, one
might wonder whether object agreement just forces a definite or specific interpretation of the di-
rect object. This would mean that a ralm ‘water’ would have to be construed as either definite
or specific in (6), contrary to fact. But it is not necessary to rely on the English translations for
evidence; Karttunen’s (1969) diagnostic for discourse referentiality will let us probe for (non-)
specificity in Palauan, leading to more concrete evidence in favor of the analysis outlined above.
The Palauan negative polarity item ngii di will be instrumental to the discussion below, so I will
begin by briefly sketching its distribution.
Like English any, Palauan ngii di may serve as both a negative polarity item (NPI) and as
a free choice item (FCI). Ladusaw (1979) and many others have shown that NPIs are licensed in
the scope of a downward-entailing operator, like under negation. Palauan ngii di is subject to the
same restriction.
(7) a. I don’t have any potatoes. (Kadmon & Landman 1993: 353, ex. 1)
b. * I have any potatoes. (Kadmon & Landman 1993: 353, ex. 2)
(8) a. Ng
3SG
diak
false
[k-ulab
1SG.IRR-hold.PFV
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
chemutii
sweet.potato
pro].
I
“I’m not holding any sweet potatoes.”
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b. * Ak
1SG
olab
hold.PFV
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
chemutii
sweet.potato
pro.
I
(“I’m holding any sweet potatoes.”)
Giannakidou (to appear; see also numerous references therein) provides further examples of NPIs
licensed in other non-veridical environments that do not necessarily have to be downward-entailing
(such as questions). Palauan NPI ngii di is also licensed in questions with both positive and nega-
tive polarity.
(9) a. Ng
3SG
ngar er ngii
exist
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
chemutii
sweet.potato
er
at
tiang
here
pro?
there.EXPL
“Are there any sweet potatoes here?”
b. Ng
3SG
diak
not.exist
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
chemutii
sweet.potato
er
at
tiang
here
pro?
there.EXPL
“There aren’t any sweet potatoes here?”
Turning to some contexts in which free choice items are licit, Menéndez-Benito (2005)
demonstrates that Spanish FCI cualquiera is licensed under deontic modality as in (10a), but not
in episodic sentences as in (10b).
(10) a. Juan puede coger cualquier carta.
“Juan can take any card.” (Menéndez-Benito 2005: 31, ex. 23)
b. * Ayer, Juan cogió cualquier carta.
(“Yesterday, Juan took any card.”) (Menéndez-Benito 2005: 2, ex. 3)
Similarly, Palauan ngii di is licensed and receives a FCI interpretation under the nominal deontic
modal sebech “ability (to...)” as in (11a), but not in episodic sentences such as (11b).
(11) a. Ng
3SG
sebechem
your.ability
[el
LNK
ng-uu
take.PFV-3SG
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
kat]
card
pro.
it.EXPL
“You can take any card.” (lit. “It is your ability to take any card.”)
b. * Ke
2SG
ngil-uu
took.PFV
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
kat
card
er
on
a kesus
last.night
pro.
you
(“Last night, you took any card.”)
We have now seen that Palauan ngii di may function either as an NPI or as an FCI, depending on
the operator that licenses it. For our purposes, the key point in the discussion is simply that ngii di
functions as an NPI in the scope of downward-entailing and non-veridical operators.
Leaving ngii di aside for a moment, let us turn to the syntax of existentials. A growing
body of research has lent cross-linguistic support to Milsark’s (1977: 4–9, 1979 [1974], et seq.)
claim that the pivot of an English existential cannot be occupied a “strong” DP (one of the two
so-called definiteness effects)—see (12).
(12) a. There is(n’t) a teacher in the room.
b. * There is(n’t) the teacher in the room.
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Palauan appears to be another language that exhibits this sort of definiteness effect—compare (13a)
and (13b).
(13) a. Ng
3SG
ngar er ngii/diak
exist/not.exist
a sensei
teacher
er
at
tiang
here
pro.
there.EXPL
“There is/isn’t a/(*the) teacher here.”
b. * Ng
3SG
ngar er ngii/diak
exist/not.exist
{ngke
that
el
LNK
sensei
teacher
/
/
ngii
him
/
/
a Aki}
Aki
er
at
tiang
here
pro.
there.EXPL
(“There is/isn’t {that teacher / him / Aki} here.”)
The only difference between (13a) and (13b) is the DP that occupies the pivot position, so the
difference in grammaticality between them likely results from some sort of restriction on the DPs
that may occupy the pivot position, just as in English. Furthermore, the fact that a sensei ‘teacher’
in (13a) cannot be interpreted as definite suggests that the restriction has to do with definiteness.
Now, the examples in (14a–b) show that DPs containing the NPI ngii di can also appear in the
pivot of an existential, but as expected, ngii di is still infelicitous in a pivot position that is not in
the scope of a downward-entailing or non-veridical operator, as shown in (14c).
(14) a. Ng
3SG
dimlak
not.existed
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
kerrekar
tree
er
in
a sers
garden
pro.
there.EXPL
“There wasn’t any (kind of) tree in the garden.” NEGATION
b. Ng
3SG
mla er ngii
existed
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
kerrekar
tree
er
in
a sers
garden
pro?
there.EXPL
“Was there any (kind of) tree in the garden?” QUESTION
c. * Ng
3SG
mla er ngii
existed
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
kerrekar
tree
er
in
a sers
garden
pro.
there.EXPL
(“There was any tree in the garden.”) POSITIVE POLARITY
The crucial point to take away from (14) is that DPs containing NPI ngii di pattern with the indef-
inite DP in (13a) rather than with the various definite DPs (pronouns, demonstratives, and proper
names) in (13b). This suggests that DPs containing NPI ngii di are also indefinite.
The pieces are now in place to test for specificity following Karttunen’s (1969) diagnos-
tic: indefinite DPs are specific if they establish a discourse referent—see (15)—but non-specific if
no discourse referent is established—see (16).
(15) Bill has a car. (Karttunen 1969: 4, ex. 3a)
a. It is black.
b. The car is black.
c. Bill’s car is black.
(16) Bill doesn’t have a car. (Karttunen 1969: 4, ex. 4a)
a. # It is black.
b. # The car is black.
c. # Bill’s car is black.
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After (15) is uttered, (15a–c) can refer back to the discourse referent established by a car,
indicating that a car in (15) is specific. In (16), on the other hand, a car appears under negation
so there is no discourse referent established. Examples (16a–c) are infelicitous, so a car in (16) is
non-specific. Thus, an indefinite is non-specific iff it neither establishes a new discourse referent
nor refers to a previously established discourse referent.
Theoretically, we should be able to apply this diagnostic to Palauan. In Palauan, as we
have seen above, “bare” DPs (consisting of the determiner a + NP) are ambiguous between either
a definite or an indefinite interpretation.
(17) Ak
1SG
chiliu-ii
read.PAST.PFV-3SG
a hong
book
pro.
I
“I read a book/the book.”
a. Ng
3SG
chedelekelek
black
pro.
it
“It’s black.”
b. Ng
3SG
chedelekelek
black
se
that
el
LNK
hong.
book
“The book is black.” (lit., “That book (that I mentioned) is black.”)
The felicity of (17a–b) indicates that a hong either refers to a previously established discourse
referent (if definite) or establishes a new discourse referent (if indefinite). According to Karttunen’s
diagnostic, a hong in (17) is either a definite DP or a specific indefinite DP. But under negation, the
situation gets more complicated. If Palauan behaves the way English does, then indefinites under
negation are expected to be non-specific, but definites under negation should remain definite. As
the judgments of (18a–b) indicate—as well as the English translation of (18)—the situation is
hardly clear.
(18) Ng
3SG
dimlak
false.PAST
k-chuieu-ii
1SG.IRR-read.PFV-3SG
a hong
book
pro.
I
“I didn’t read a book/the book.”
a. #? Ng
3SG
chedelekelek
black
pro.
it
“It’s black.”
b. #? Ng
3SG
chedelekelek
black
se
that
el
LNK
hong.
book
“The book is black.” (lit., “That book (that I mentioned) is black.”)
I claim that the felicity judgments for (18a–b) are clouded because there are two competing inter-
pretations for the DP a hong in (18) available:
• A hong is definite: reference in (18a–b) to the entity it names is felicitous.
• A hong is indefinite (and non-specific because it is under negation): reference in (18a–b) to
the entity it names is infelicitous (there is no discourse referent to refer to).
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This is the type of situation in which we can use our knowledge of the properties of existentials
and the NPI ngii di to tease apart the ambiguity. In particular, three facts are relevant. First,
definite DPs cannot appear in the pivot of an existential, which we saw in (13a–b). Second, DPs
containing NPI ngii di can appear in the pivot of an existential, suggesting that they are not definite.
Third, Karttunen’s diagnostic shows that an indefinite under negation should receive a non-specific
interpretation.
Putting these three facts together, we predict that the addition of ngii di to the direct object
DP a hong ‘book’ in (18) to form a ngii di el hong ‘any book’ should resolve the ambiguity, since
it should be treated as a non-specific indefinite under negation. (18a–b) should then be judged
sharply infelicitous. This is exactly what we find in (19) and (20).
(19) Ng
3SG
dimlak
false.PAST
k-chuieu-ii
1SG.IRR-read.PFV-3SG
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
hong
book
pro.
I
“I didn’t read any book.”
a. # Ng
3SG
chedelekelek
black
pro.
it
“It’s black.”
b. # Ng
3SG
chedelekelek
black
se
that
el
LNK
hong.
book
“The book is black.”
(20) Ng
3SG
dimlak
false.PAST
k-chuiu
1SG.IRR-read.PFV
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
hong
books
pro.
I
“I didn’t read any books.”
cannot mean: (“I didn’t read any book.”)
a. # Ng
3PL.INAN
chedelekelek
black
pro.
they
“They’re black.”
b. # Ng
3PL.INAN
chedelekelek
black
aike
those
el
LNK
hong.
book
“The books are black.”
What is interesting about examples (19) and (20) is that they conform to the pattern estab-
lished for the mass noun DPs in (6). From this, I take away the following. P-DOA is a (mostly)
standard object agreement system but with one peculiarity: there are distinct agreement forms for
human plurals (-terir) and non-human plurals (no suffix). If P-DOA really were identical to I-
DOM, then we should predict that a ngii di el hong in (20) should be ambiguous between a plural
and a singular interpretation. While this is impossible in (20), note that its corresponding sentence
containing an imperfective verb in (21) does in fact allow for the singular/plural ambiguity.
(21) Ng
3SG
dimlak
false.PAST
ku-nguiu
1SG.IRR-read.IMPFV
a ngii di
any
el
LNK
hong
book
pro.
I
“I wasn’t reading any book/any books.”
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a. # Ng
3SG/3PL.INAN
chedelekelek
black
pro.
it/they
“It’s/They’re black.”
b. # Ng
3SG/3PL.INAN
chedelekelek
black
se/aike
that/those
el
LNK
hong.
book
“The book(s) is/are black.”
There is now evidence that case-marking disparities betweeen I-DOM and P-DOA are not
limited to sentences containing mass noun direct objects, but also those with count noun DPs in
direct object position. As a consequence, an attempt to save the unified DOM analysis of I-DOM
and P-DOA by explaining the disparity as a consequence of the properties of mass nouns would fail
to account for the differences between (19), (20), and (21). The unified DOM analysis of I-DOM
and P-DOA is no longer viable.
Nonetheless, the situation is not alarming. As an alternative to the unified DOM analysis,
I have already suggested that perhaps only I-DOM is a true DOM system. That P-DOA is not
a differential object agreement system is somewhat surprising given the overlap in the instances
of non-human plurals triggering neither agreement morphology in P-DOA nor accusative case-
marking in I-DOM. But these are not the only areas in Palauan syntax in which non-human plurals
fail to exhibit morphology associated with human plurals. Independent evidence that non-human
plurals are treated differently from other classes of DPs arises from at least five other domains in
Palauan morphosyntax.
4. Peculiarities Surrounding Non-Human Plurals in Palauan
Smith-Stark (1974; see also Corbett (2000: Ch. 3) describes what he calls “plurality splits,” in
which plural nouns have different morphological forms or different syntactic behavior depending
on their animacy features. In Palauan, non-human plurals nouns are treated differently from human
plurals in a handful of ways other than their behavior as direct objects.
There are two different ways in which the forms of DPs themselves differ morphologically
depending on animacy. First, distinct sets of demonstrative morphemes exist for human plurals
and non-human plurals, and second, the plural noun prefix re- may only attach to human plurals—
non-human plurals are morphologically identical to singulars.
(22) Non-human plurals and human plurals select different demonstrative morphemes.
a. aika
these
el
LNK
bad
stones
/
/
aike
those
el
LNK
bad
stones
“these stones” / “those stones”
b. tirka
these
el
LNK
chad
person
/
/
tirke
those
el
LNK
chad
person
“these people” / “those people”
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(23) (Bare) non-human plurals do not allow the plural re- prefix; human plurals require it.
a. a bad
stones
/
/
(*a re-bad)
stones
“(the/some) stones”
b. (*a chad)4
people
/
/
a re-chad
people
“(the/some) people”
Next, there are also two ways in which non-human plurals differ from human plurals from
the point of view of agreement (besides the object agreement pattern at issue here). Human plurals
trigger a pre-verbal subject agreement clitic te. 3SG nouns trigger a different clitic ng, which is
also used for non-human plurals. The same situation holds for possessor agreement: non-human
plural possessors trigger the same possessor agreement inflection (usually a form of -(e)l) on the
possessed noun as 3SG possessors, rather than the human plural form -(r)ir.
(24) Non-human plurals share the 3SG subject agreement clitic ng; human plurals trigger a dis-
tinct pre-verbal clitic te.
a. Ng
3SG/3PL.INAN
klebokel
pretty
a bad.
stone
“The stone is pretty.”
or: “The stones are pretty.”
b. Te
3PL
klebokel
pretty
a rechad.
people
“The people are pretty.”
(25) Non-human plurals share the 3SG possessor agreement suffix -(e)l; human plurals trigger a
distinct suffix -(r)ir.
a. a bedeng-el
body-3SG/3PL.INAN
a bad
stone
“the color of the stone”
or: “the color of the stones”
b. a bedeng-ir
body-3PL
a rechad
people
“the people’s complexion”
And finally, there is no overt resumptive pronoun for an object gap after an imperfective
verb in an A-bar dependency with a non-human plural, whereas an object gap in an A-bar depen-
dency with a human plural must be filled with the resumptive pronoun tir, which gets case-marked
(see Georgopoulos 1991 for discussion).
4 Note that a chad is grammatical on its singular interpretation, just not on its plural interpretation.
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(26) Non-human plurals leave a an object gap after imperfective verbs in A-bar dependencies;
human plurals are co-indexed with a resumptive pronoun.
a. [DP Aike
these
el
LNK
siasing]i
photos
a
TOP
ku-lemes
1SG.IRR-saw.IMPFV
__i/(*er
GAP/ACC
tiri)
3PL
pro
I
er
on
a elii.
yesterday
“These photos, I was looking at (them) yesterday.”
b. [DP Tirke
these
el
LNK
ngalek]i
child
a
TOP
ku-lemes
1SG.IRR-saw.IMPFV
er
ACC
tiri/(*__i)
3PL/GAP
pro
I
er
on
a elii.
yesterday
“These children, I was watching them yesterday.”
In all of these examples, non-human plurals differ from human plurals in some morpholog-
ical way. Non-human plurals may entirely lack morphological marking that characterizes human
plurals as in the case of (23) and (26), they may share the morphology of 3SG DPs while human
plurals have distinct morphology as in (24) and (25), or they may have their own morphology
distinct from both human plurals and 3SG DPs as in (22). Together, these facts suggest that the
peculiar behavior of non-human plurals in both I-DOM and P-DOA might be attributable to some
greater language-internal factor in Palauan that treats them separately from human plurals. If this
is the case, an explanation of their properties in I-DOM and P-DOA could be centered around their
unique properties as DPs rather than as esoteric characteristics of the constructions they appear in.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have seen that Palauan serves as an example of a language in which two distinct
DOM systems appear to co-exist—each associated with a particular verbal aspect (imperfective or
perfective). The imperfective system, which I have called I-DOM, is a dependent-marking system
in which the accusative case marker er appears before most (but not all) direct object DPs. The
perfective system, which I have called P-DOA, is a head-marking system in which most (but not
all) direct object DPs trigger object agreement morphology on the verb. A simple explanation
of the co-existence of these two systems has traditionally assumed that they are morphological
variants of the same syntactic phenomenon, i.e., that there is actually just one DOM system that
has two different morphological disguises.
Examining the data containing mass noun direct objects in (5) and (6) from the point of
view of Aissen’s (2003) DOM analysis emphasizes that the two systems are not one and the
same: I-DOM is sensitive to number, animacy, and specificity, while P-DOA is sensitive only
to number and animacy. Furthermore, an attempt to save the unified DOM analysis of I-DOM
and P-DOA by explaining the disparity as a consequence of the properties of mass nouns would
fail to account for the differences between (19), (20), and (21), which together offer evidence that
the mass noun disparity also transfers to count nouns in particular contexts. It has been suggested
to me that I elicit DPs of quantity, such as “a bag of apples” or “boxes of sugar,” to see whether
the interaction of the measure DP with the quantity DP can shed more light on matters relevant
to DOM.5 At any rate, the unified DOM analysis of I-DOM and P-DOA no longer appears to be
5 I thank Masha Polinsky for her insight here.
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viable, given this new data. Still, Aissen’s (2003) analysis successfully accounts for both of the
systems, and an interesting effect of applying her hierarchy to the Palauan cases is that it highlights
how different constructions within a single language can draw the cutoff point at different places
along the feature hierarchies. As a result, the two Palauan systems show that parameterization
might not just be across languages but also across constructions within a single language.
While it would be a trivial task to add the lack of er-marking in I-DOM (as well as the lack
of an overt object agreement suffix in P-DOA) to the list of particularities of non-human plurals
described in section 4, we would not come any closer to explaining why the various groups of
feature values yield particular morphological patterns and others do not, rather than the other way
around. Individuation (see Hopper & Thompson 1980, Nunberg 1983, and many others) may be
a promising route to take to draw the relevant distinction in Palauan. Definitions of individuation
vary, but (roughly) human DPs, referential DPs, and singular DPs may be thought of as more
“individuated” than inanimate DPs, non-referential DPs, or plural DPs (see also Malchukov 2008
for discussion directly pertaining to DOM). Although an analysis based on individuation may be
stipulative for Palauan (for instance, the extent to which individuation can explain differences in the
behavior of mass nouns in I-DOM in a satisfying way is not obvious to me), but the typologically
unusual grouping of (even definite) non-human plurals with non-specific indefinites would begin
to make more sense if individuation was the relevant factor in determining the presence or absence
of er in I-DOM.
Whatever the deeper reason for the organization of accusative case marking system in
Palauan, this paper sheds light on several empirical issues. The properties of polarity operators
were investigated to the extent that polarity can now be used as a limited diagnostic for hierarchi-
cal relations in Palauan. The discovery of a Palauan definiteness effect similar to that in English
made it possible to identify indefinite DPs even in the absence of a morphological distinction from
definite DPs. Investigations into polarity and the syntax of existentials showed that P-DOA is just
a standard object agreement system. We can thus conclude that Palauan has only a single DOM
system of (at least) three dimensions (animacy, specificity, and number) with a distribution limited
to the domain of imperfective predicates, rather than two different full-fledged DOM systems. If
this analysis is correct, then the apparently unusual status of Palauan in our cross-linguistic under-
standing of DOM systems is clarified, and Palauan is in many ways quite similar to languages with
more familiar systems like those in Hindi (e.g., Mohanan 1994), Turkish (e.g., Enç 1991), Persian
(e.g., Lazard 1982), and Spanish (e.g., Isenberg 1968), for instance.
References
Aissen, Judith. 2003. Differential object marking: Iconicity vs. economy. Natural Language &
Linguistic Theory 21:435–483.
Bossong, Georg. 1985. Empirische Universalienforschung: Differentielle Objektmarkierung in
den neuiranischen Sprachen. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag.
Chomsky, Noam. 2000. Minimalist inquiries: The framework. Step by step: Essays on Minimalist
syntax in honor of Howard Lasnik, ed. Roger Martin, David Michaels, and Juan Uriagereka,
89–155. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
The Proceedings of AFLA 16
149
Chomsky, Noam. 2001. Derivation by phase. Ken Hale: A life in language, ed. Michael Kenstow-
icz, 1–52. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 2004. Beyond explanatory adequacy. Structures and beyond, ed. Adriana Bel-
letti, 104–131. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Comrie, Bernard. 1979. Definite and animate direct objects: A natural class. Linguistica Silesiana
2:13–21.
Corbett, Greville. 2000. Number. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
Enç, Mürvet. 1991. The semantics of specificity. Linguistic Inquiry 22:1–25.
Flora, Jo-Ann. 1974. Palauan phonology and morphology. Doctoral Dissertation, University of
California, San Diego.
Georgopoulos, Carol. 1991. Syntactic variables: Resumptive pronouns and A’ binding in Palauan.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Giannakidou, Anastasia. to appear. Negative and positive polarity items: Licensing, compositional-
ity and variation. Semantics: An international handbook of natural language meaning, ed.
Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger, and Paul Portner. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Hagège, Claude. 1986. La langue palau: Une curiosité typologique. Munich: Wilhelm Fink
Verlag.
Hopper, Paul J., and Sandra A. Thompson. 1980. Transitivity in grammar and discourse. Language
56:251–299.
Isenberg, Horst. 1968. Das direkte Objekt im Spanischen. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Josephs, Lewis. 1975. Palauan reference grammar. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Josephs, Lewis. 1997. Handbook of Palauan grammar: Volume I. Koror: Ministry of Education,
Republic of Palau.
Josephs, Lewis. 1999. Handbook of Palauan grammar: Volume II. Koror: Ministry of Education,
Republic of Palau.
Karttunen, Lauri. 1969. Discourse referents. The proceedings of the 1969 International Conference
on Computational Linguistics (COLING 69). Sång-Säby, Sweden.
Kidima, Lukowa. 1987. Object agreement and topicality hierarchies in Kiyaka. Studies in African
Linguistics 18:175–209.
Ladusaw, William. 1979. Polarity sensitivity as inherent scope relations. Doctoral Dissertation,
University of Texas, Austin. Published by the Indiana University Linguistics Club, 1980.
Lazard, Gilbert. 1982. Le morphème râ en persan et les relations actancielles. Bulletin de la
société de linguistique de Paris 73:177–208.
Lemaréchal, Alain. 1991. Problèmes de sémantique et de syntaxe en Palau. Paris: Presses du
CNRS.
Malchukov, Andrej. 2008. Animacy and asymmetries in differential case marking. Lingua
118:203–221.
McFadden, Thomas. 2004. The position of morphological case in the derivation: A study on the
syntax–morphology interface. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.
Menéndez-Benito, Paula. 2005. The grammar of choice. Doctoral Dissertation, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst.
Milsark, Gary. 1974. Existential sentences in English. Doctoral Dissertation, MIT. Published
The Proceedings of AFLA 16
150
1979, New York: Garland.
Milsark, Gary. 1977. Toward an explanation of certain peculiarities of the existential construction
in English. Linguistic Analysis 3:1–30.
Mohanan, Tara. 1994. Argument structure in Hindi. Stanford: CSLI.
Nichols, Johanna. 1986. Head-marking and dependent-marking grammar. Language 62:56–119.
Nuger, Justin. 2007. The case of objects. Syntax Qualifying Paper, University of California, Santa
Cruz.
Nuger, Justin. forthcoming. Architecture of the Palauan verbal complex. Doctoral Dissertation,
University of California, Santa Cruz.
Nunberg, Geoffrey. 1983. Individuation in context. Proceedings of WCCFL 2, 203–217. Stanford:
Stanford Linguistics Department.
Smith-Stark, T. Cedric. 1974. The plurality split. Papers from CLS 10, 657–671. Chicago: Chicago
Linguistic Society.
de Swart, Peter. 2007. Cross-linguistic variation in object marking. Doctoral Dissertation, Radboud
Universiteit Nijmegen. Published in the LOT Dissertation Series (no. 168).
Waters, Richard. 1980. Topicalization and passive in Palauan. Ms., MIT.
Wilson, Helen I. 1972. The phonology and syntax of Palauan verb affixes. Doctoral Dissertation,
University of Hawaii. Published 1972. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Working Papers in
Linguistics 4.5.
Woolford, Ellen. 2000. Object agreement in Palauan: Specificity, humanness, economy and opti-
mality. Formal issues in Austronesian linguistics, ed. Ileana Paul, Vivianne Phillips, and
Lisa Travis, 215–245. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
The Proceedings of AFLA 16
151
